[SR-Users] Detecting calls with missing ACK (Lazy SIP scanners)
Marrold
kamailio at marrold.co.uk
Wed Apr 6 01:57:14 CEST 2016
Hi Charles,
I can confirm that t_any_timeout(), and t_branch_timeout() return true when
these un-ACKd transactions occur.
I just needed to make sure that I set a failure route, in my reply route.
Thanks for the tip.
On Tue, Apr 5, 2016 at 1:56 PM, Charles Chance <
charles.chance at sipcentric.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> You should probably check out TM docs - specifically failure route (
> http://kamailio.org/docs/modules/stable/modules/tm.html#tm.f.t_on_failure)
> and t_is_expired (
> http://kamailio.org/docs/modules/stable/modules/tm.html#tm.f.t_is_expired
> ).
>
> From there you can do what you like.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Charles
> On 5 Apr 2016 1:22 p.m., "Marrold" <kamailio at marrold.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> I am interested in 'fingerprinting' various SIP scanner attacks and using
>> them to intelligently block attacks, rather than just blindly black listing
>> any SIP message to a honey pot.
>>
>> Additionally I think it would be wise to detect these missing ACKs and/or
>> incomplete transactions from a legitimately mis-configured or
>> malfunctioning end point, to help protect the core network from needless
>> re-transmissions.
>>
>> Having checked the Asterisk logs, this is what I'm looking to block if a
>> certain threshold is exceeded-
>>
>> [2016-04-05 13:10:52] WARNING[2010] chan_sip.c: Retransmission timeout
>> reached on transmission eff430b8c1b6d21c2058049f41a7ec57 for seqno 1
>> (Critical Response)
>>
>> Thanks
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 5, 2016 at 1:14 PM, Daniel Tryba <d.tryba at pocos.nl> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 12:09:29AM +0100, Marrold wrote:
>>> > I have been running a couple of Asterisk honey pots to get a better
>>> > understanding of the tools and methods potential hackers are using to
>>> > exploit SIP servers.
>>> >
>>> > I have observed many attacks from the 'sipcli' user agent that don't
>>> send
>>> > ACKs.
>>> [...]
>>> > Please could anyone point me in the right direction to detect these non
>>> > completed calls with a missing ACK in Kamailio? I am unsure on the
>>> > terminology I should be using to search the online documentation.
>>>
>>> Why do you care? The attacker doesn't care about receiving SIP messages,
>>> they are only interested in initiating a call to a target, if the target
>>> gets dialled you will be abused, by either an other source with a fully
>>> function SIP stack or just something that might be spoofed.
>>>
>>> What I do is blacklist addresses that send any SIP messages to my
>>> honeypots, might be dangerous since with UDP anything can be spoofed (so
>>> better make sure you have a whitelist and there is no connection between
>>> the honeypots and your client facing SIP platform)
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> SIP Express Router (SER) and Kamailio (OpenSER) - sr-users mailing list
>>> sr-users at lists.sip-router.org
>>> http://lists.sip-router.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users
>>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
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